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Abstract 
Supranational law shows phenomena of fragmentation, as well as aspects of consti-
tutionalization. Theories that deal with global constitutionalism analyze phenomena of 
constitutionalization of supranational law, as well as the prescriptive requirements of 
this process. This paper analyzes the different ways in which it is possible to understand 
global constitutionalism, and in a preliminary way addresses its relevance to the theory 
and the concept of law.
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Resumen 
El derecho supranacional presenta fenómenos de fragmentación, además de aspec-
tos de constitucionalización. Las teorías que se ocupan del constitucionalismo global 
analizan los fenómenos de constitucionalización del derecho supranacional, tal como 
los requisitos prescriptivos de este proceso. Este artículo versa sobre las diversas mane-
ras en las que es posible comprender el constitucionalismo global y, sobre todo, analiza 
su relevancia para la teoría y el concepto de derecho. 
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Introduction
The idea of  global constitutionalism is one of the approaches to transnational law 
(or supranational law)1 that in the current debate is a subject of extensive analysis: so 
much is that the case that this perspective has been called “the international legal term 
du jour.”2 On an even deeper level, global constitutionalism is regarded as “a new so-
cial phenomenon” that in supranational law marks “a qualitative shift from globalized 
towards constitutionalized relations.”3 Global constitutionalism is seen as one aspect of 
“international relations in the 21st century”, which relations are characterized both by 
an “increase of things constitutional such as constitutionalization, quasi-constitutional 
settings and practices” and, in the opposite direction, by a “contested compliance with 
international law, rules and procedures by powerful actors in the international system.”4 
The term global constitutionalism refers to a theoretical proposal that, with sometimes 
very different nuances, argues, in a descriptive and normative sense, for the progres-
sive development of the processes of constitutionalization of supranational law. More 
precisely, the approaches that refer to global constitutionalism analyze, in a descriptive 
sense, the process of constitutionalization of supranational law (global constitutional-
ization), and at the same time, in a normative sense, they indicate some basic constitu-
tional principles that serve as indicators of the “quality” of that constitutional law. These 
approaches therefore seek to “map” and “shape” the legal relationship over the state: in 
the first case, this means “identifying and explaining the processes of constitutionalism 
at the global level”, while in the second it means “contributing to the actual processes 
1. We will use the term transnational (or supranational) law in a nonspecific meaning to synthetically express the different 
forms assumed by ultra-state law, referring at least to the law concerning the inter-, intra-, and trans-national sphere. K. 
Culver, M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, distinguish 
four types of law (legal phenomena) that arise beyond state law: intra-state legality, trans-state legality, supra-state legality, 
and super-state legality.
2. C.E.J. Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective, M. Nijhoff, Leiden-Boston, 2011, p. 1.
3. A. Wiener – A. Lang jr. – J. Tully – M. Maduro – M. Kumm, “Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and 
the Rule of Law”, in Global Constitutionalism, 1, 2012, p. 2.
4. Ibid.
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of constitutionalism through concrete proposals for legal or political innovation.”5 In 
the first case, the reference is the concept of a constitution and of constitutionalization, 
while in the second (according to different readings)6 are the principles, rules, and pro-
cedures of liberal-democratic constitutionalism.
The idea of  global constitutionalism aims to bring out a new phase of supranational 
law as opposed to the fragmentation of law that characterizes the first phase of global-
ization. This fragmentation comes from the fact that the rules of supranational law are 
the “product of highly decentralized processes”, i.e., they are born in the “specialized 
functional regimes, such as human rights, environment, trade, or international crim-
inal law.” This leads to the fact that “each functionally differentiated area of law has its 
own treaties, principles, and institutions” and so that “the values  and interests advanced 
by any particular regime are not necessarily consistent with those advanced by other 
specialized regimes.” This in turn determines the possibility that this autonomy of the 
different regimes (as regards the production of rules, institutions, and the solution of 
disputes) will result in a sort of closing or insulation from other fields, with the risk of 
“inconsistent judgments, conflicting jurisprudence, and outcomes that fail to take suffi-
cient account of the full range of relevant values. ” This phenomenon produces as more 
disruptive effect, that for which “different tribunals can provide conflicting interpreta-
tions of a particular legal norm” and so that “the same case might be resolved differently 
in different tribunals, depending inter alia on the law that they apply.”7 In essence, the 
process of fragmentation would undermine the stability of supranational law and its 
5. Ibid., p. 8, which on the basis of the prevalence of either of the two activities (mapping or shaping) distinguishes three 
orientations of global constitutionalism: the “normative” (which deals with the principles from which the global order 
should develop); the “functional” (aimed more at investigating the taxonomy of the phenomena of globalization in the 
normative dimension), and “pluralist” (combining the mapping and shaping and the prescriptive and descriptive dimen-
sions).
6. According to A. Peters, “The Merits of Global Constitutionalism”, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 16, 2009, pp. 
397 and ff., “global constitutionalization is the gradual emergence of constitutionalist features in international law”, while 
“global constitutionalism is an agenda that identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in 
the international legal sphere.”
7. On these issues, and for the quotations, see J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Cons-
titutionalization”, in J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 6-9. Among the reported conflicts is that between the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
liability “for the acts of irregular forces” (leading to alternative solutions to the former Yugoslavia and Nicaragua, solutions 
that have subsequently been upheld by the courts); also reported is the Belilos case, in which the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) did not apply the rules concerning treaty reservations, arguing for their invalidity on the basis of the 
constitutional nature of the European Convention on Human Rights; there is also the possibility that the same case should 
be dealt with in different jurisdictions, as in the conflict over swordfish between Chile and the European Community, 
which was submitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
and the possibility that the same Court (the WTO Appellate Body) should decide similar cases differently on the basis of 
regulations that come from agreements between different States.
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coherence and consistency. For the authors who argue for global constitutionalism, 
however, this is, as we have noted, only one phase (or trend) of supranational law.8
Global constitutionalism is an evolution, with significant new features, of the classi-
cal idea of the constitutional construction of international law that can be traced back 
to the Reine Rechtslehre and of the interpretation proposed by A. Verdross,9 mostly from 
a natural law perspective, of the Grundnorm and the Kelsenian primacy of international 
law. The idea of  global constitutionalism, as we have seen, has not only a normative di-
mension, but also a strong descriptive one. In addition, the normative dimension, rather 
than the search for a formal constitution of the supranational order (which is mostly 
vertical both in relation to standardization and to governing bodies), tries to identify 
what the essential and possible elements of the process of constitutionalization should 
be at the international level (and is therefore predominantly seen from a pluralist point 
of view).10
The idea of  global constitutionalism therefore outlines some strands of evolution of 
supranational law and raises the question of the normative characteristics of interna-
tional constitutionalism. These are important issues that pose significant questions for 
the theory of law. The general framework is of course the relation between globalization 
and legal theory that has so far been analyzed, especially in light of the fragmentation 
of the law. The following remarks will follow the same path, but in light of the issues 
that emerge from the process and the requirements of constitutionalization. This means 
asking questions such as “What are transnational legal phenomena? Do these phenom-
ena fall outside the theoretical limits of traditional legal theory? And how can we make 
sense of these phenomena from the point of view of legal philosophy”11 in relation to the 
constitutionalization of the international order?
8. For an accurate picture of the different tendencies in the process toward the globalization of law, see S. Cassese, Oltre lo 
Stato, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2006; R. Deplano, “Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation of International Law: A Theoreti-
cal Inquiry”, in European Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 2013, pp. 67-89.
9. See A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Springer, Wien, 1926.
10. A. Wiener – A. Lang jr. – J. Tully – M. Maduro – M. Kumm, “Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law”, pp. 4-5, underline that “the normative debate about the dimensions of what constitutional quality in the 
global realm ‘ought’ to look like, on the one hand, and which range of constitutional practices that might be ‘possible’ given 
the global diversity of constitutional practice, on the other, has only recently emerged”: these aspects make it possible to 
consider global constitutionalism “a novel concept” and see it as an evolution of other labels such as “‘modern constitutio-
nalism’, ‘constitutionalism beyond the state’, ‘postnational constitutionalism’ or ‘European constitutionalism’.” For a com-
parison of the constitutionalism proposed by Kelsen and Verdross (based on the identification of a “hierarchically superior 
source”) and the current debate, see A.L. Paulus, “The International Legal System as a Constitution”, in J.L. Dunoff, J.P. 
Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, pp. 71 and ff.
11. H. Micklitz, D. Patterson, Transnational Legal Theory. Seminar Description, http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCen-
tres/Law/ResearchAndTeaching/Seminars/2012-2013-II/TransnationalLegalTheory.aspx 
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In what follows we will analyze (a) the ways in which it is possible investigate and 
identify the process of constitutionalization of law; (b) the different settings and differ-
ent requirements proposed – at the normative level and in the context of global consti-
tutionalism – for the justification (and evolution) of this process; and (c) some aspects 
relevant to the theory of law. In the latter case, we will only provide a list of such aspects.
Outlines of the process of constitutionalization 
The identification of the key elements contributing to the process of constitutional-
ization of supranational law can be developed in different ways, that is, there are different 
ways to explain what is seen as an “important qualitative change in how international law 
and governance is in fact organized.”12 The starting point is the process of globalization 
(linked in particular to the economy): the increase in relationships makes it “more valu-
able for actors to enter into denser legal and institutional relationships, including consti-
tutionalized relationships.” As we have noted, the increase in supranational relationships 
leads in parallel to an increase in demand for legal regulation, which in turn translates 
into an “increasing demand for international constitutional norms and processes that fa-
cilitate the production of international legal rules.” In this sense, the process of constitu-
tionalization is a “reply” to the fragmentation (seen as a “lack of centralized legislative and 
adjudicative institutions”) that in general terms seeks to develop “centralized institutions” 
while “specifying a hierarchy among rules or adjudicators.”13 The starting point is that 
“nobody doubts that International law has evolved considerably after WWII and again 
after the end of the Cold War. It is not disputed that there are features of international law 
that bear some resemblance to features associated with domestic constitutional law.”14 It is 
“larger trajectories in international relations” that impose a need to classify more evident 
processes that bring about “the increased density and reach of international norms, the 
increasing importance of new legal actors in international legal processes, and the rise of 
new topics of international legal regulation.”15
12. A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes”, in Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, 16, 2009, p. 621.
13. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, p. 8.
14. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, paper presented 
at the “Global Constitutionalism” seminar, EUI, Fiesole, 23 March 2013, p. 1.
15. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, p. 4, for whom this de-
velopment takes shape “along with an increasing sense that some of these developments threaten elements of domestic 
constitutional structures.”
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It is possible to identify at least three different ways by which to identify the charac-
teristics of the constitutional process: the first is the one that brings out the main lines 
of development of supra-national law in relation to key normatively substantive and 
procedural aspects enshrined in contemporary constitutions and present in the histor-
ical and value acquisition  of constitutionalism; the second, more limited, tends in the 
same way to read the process of constitutionalization in light of the formal features of 
the constitutions; finally, the third tries to find these characters in relation to the “func-
tions” performed by the constitutions. It can be said that in many ways these approaches 
give an account of the various features a constitution may take on, namely, its formal, 
functional (in the broad sense), and substantial characteristics.16
An example of the first approach is the one proposed by Anne Peters, which (fa-
voring the substantive aspects) couples various constituent elements of the constitu-
tion and constitutionalization. In her view, it is possible to identify different elements 
(whose protagonists/promoters are both “international lawmakers as political actors” 
and “most of all [the] international judiciary”): These elements are (a) the transition 
from “sovereignty to humanity” as a reference point of supranational law (this is evident 
in the “international system of human rights protection”); (b) the constitutionalization 
of “international legal subjects” (which affects the integration of the principle of ef-
fectiveness for the recognition of the subjects of international law through the “inter-
national legal standard of self-determination, non-use of force, protections of human 
rights, minority rights, and even democracy”; the international recognition of more 
rights to individuals; and the proliferation and autonomy of international organizations 
and institutions); (c) the constitutionalization of the sources of law (in the form of both 
jus cogens and “erga omnes norms”); (d) the gradual “participation and transparency” of 
international legal procedures (as happened, for example, with the WTO International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes – ICSID); (e) the increasing identifi-
cation of supra-constitutional principles and goods (such as the rule of law, democracy, 
16. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 1, identifies 
three features of the process of constitutionalization which correspond to three aspects of the constitution: these are the 
formal (regarding the hierarchy of norms in the international arena, a hierarchy that among other places can be found in 
the “jus cogens norms” and in “Art. 103 of the UN Charter, establishing the priority of the UN Charter over other agree-
ments”); the functional (concerning, for example, “multilateral treaties that serve as regime-specific constitutional charters 
for institutionally complex transnational governance practices”); and the substantial (which refers, among other things, to 
“human rights obligations”, which “have long pierced the veil of sovereignty that kept the relationship between the state 
and its citizens from the purview of international law” and by virtue of which “the individual has long emerged as a subject 
of rights and obligations under international law. There are international human rights courts established by Treaties that 
authorize individuals to vindicate their rights before international courts.” These are “features more characteristic of mo-
dern constitutional systems than of the traditional paradigm of international law as the law among states.”
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peace and security, and climate control); and (f) the gradual subjection to legal rules and 
the wholly judicial resolution of disputes (with reference to the progressive emergence 
of legal procedures and courts, from the ICSID to the International Criminal Court).17
An example of the second perspective is the one proposed by A. Stone Sweet, which 
bases its analysis on the concept of a constitution: “I define a constitution as a body of 
meta-norms, those higher-order legal rules and principles that specify how all other 
lower-order legal norms are to be produced, applied, enforced, and interpreted. New 
constitutions also establish procedures and institutions for protecting rights against 
governmental incursion, typically in the form of a supreme or constitutional court.”18 
In this view, the process of constitutionalization is mainly linked to the achievement 
of the “systemic unity, coherence and completeness of international law.”19 A similar 
approach is the analysis of Wallace Brown, according to whom “to ‘constitutionalize’ 
something is to establish formal legal processes where legal rights and duties are cod-
ified and where the authoritative mechanisms for legal adjudication are clearly delin-
eated”, while at the same time “making an entity subject to the legal jurisdiction of 
an established constitutional order.”20 This results in supranational law, in the fact that 
“legal regimes or entities that were once independent […] are explicitly brought under 
the jurisdiction of this formal legal system, which in effect supersedes prior legal rela-
tionships and which ultimately secures a sense of mutual legal obligation”, and in the 
fact that it has a “norm solidification and normative convergence” and then “common 
norms [that] emerge from various processes of legal and political interaction.” Con-
stitutionalization therefore means the transition from “extra-legal interactions toward 
a more procedurally authoritative and constitutionalized legal order”, and so through 
“the continued building of norms and extra-legal commitments” it reaches the “estab-
lishment of a more objectified constitutive order.”21
These first two approaches may be viewed as “definitional”, which in a broader or 
narrower sense establish a set of essential elements, namely, “a group of necessary and 
sufficient conditions which determine whether a given order is constitutional or not.” 
At least in an attempt to identify the features of the constitutional process, this setting 
can run a risk, in that they both “push discourse towards terminological disputes, and 
17. On these aspects, see A. Peters, “Are We Moving towards Constitutionalization of the World Community?”, in A. Cassese 
(ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 118 and ff.
18. A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes”, p. 626.
19. C. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 
p. 123. 
20. G. Wallace Brown, “The Constitutionalization of What?”, in Global Constitutionalism, 1, 2012, p. 205.
21. Ibid., pp. 205-06.
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thereby divert attention from substantive analysis”, and produce a very broad and con-
sequently generic analysis of these elements. The risk is that of both being too rigid (that 
is, of identifying a kind of “checklist”, thus suggesting that “international constitution-
alism is a binary, ‘all or nothing’ affair”) and of interpreting requirements broadly and 
therefore leaving them vague and unspecified.22
The third approach tries to overcome these difficulties (stiffness or indetermina-
cy) through an analysis based on the functions of the constitution. The possibility of 
reading the supranational order from the standpoint of constitutionalization (and so 
of identifying elements that designate a “hierarchy and order” between rules, “coordi-
nating mechanisms” in chaotic and broken relationships, giving “normative priority 
for one set of international legal norms” over others, in such a way as to “resolve legal 
conflicts”, which “thereby produces greater predictability and certainty”) is linked to 
the identification of the functions of the constitution: such an approach “can provide 
a set of conceptual tools and inquiries” on the basis of which to “identify and evaluate 
constitutional developments in various international domains.” From this perspective 
it is therefore necessary to see how “a number of mechanisms associated with consti-
tutionalization – including fundamental rights, direct effect, supremacy, and others – 
might be understood in terms of these functions.” This makes it possible to locate the 
difference between “constitutional” and “international” law: the identification of the 
functions of the constitution makes it possible to not regard as “international constitu-
tional law those forms of international law designed to constrain domestic action.”23 In 
view of the functional analysis, if we are to make intelligible the complex process of con-
stitutionalization, we have to focus on “the purposes that international constitutional 
norms are intended to serve”: the process of constitutionalization is seen as “a type – 
rather than a quantum – of rules.” That analysis must therefore identify the purposes 
for which the constitution is designed: from here it is then possible to assess how a set of 
legal and regulatory “mechanisms” permit or contribute to the realization of these func-
tions. As is well known, the “functional” approach to the analysis of the constitutions is 
born in an American context, highlighting the diversity of functions of the constitution 
and putting forward the distinction between enabling and disabling rules.24 These two 
22. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, p. 9.
23. Ibid., pp. 4-5, 8, 12, who in regard to the relation between constitutionalization and international law note that “impo-
sing constraints on state action is the function of ordinary international law.”
24. Ibid, pp. 9-10. As is known, it was S. Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy”, in J. Elster, R. Slagstad 
(eds.), Constitutionalism and Democracy: Studies in Rationality and Social Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1988, and Id., Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, who 
drew this distinction for the analysis of the relation between constitutionalism and democracy. In Europe, U.K. Preuss, 
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functions are also at the center of the analysis of the process of constitutionalization 
of transnational law. That is, for example, the approach taken by G. Ulfstein, which 
highlights the need to move from the formal features of the constitution to its functions 
and notes that “constitutions do two things: they establish and give competence to con-
stitutional organs, and they contain limitations, procedures and mechanisms to control 
the same organs”.25
The model proposed by Dunoff and Trachtman identifies three basic functions of 
the constitution and seven mechanisms of constitutionalization. The functions include 
the following: “(1) enabling the formation of international law (i.e., enabling constitu-
tionalization), (2) constraining the formation of international law (i.e., constraining 
constitutionalization), and (3) filling gaps in domestic constitutional law that arise as a 
result of globalization (i.e., supplemental constitutionalization).” 
One can therefore speak of constitutionalization if international standards are used 
to implement one of these three functions (otherwise, it is just non-constitutional 
international law). These functions can be implemented through seven mechanisms 
“that are commonly associated with constitutionalization”: these are “(1) horizontal 
allocation of authority” (i.e., separation of powers), “(2) vertical allocation of author-
ity” (which occurs, for example, in federalism), “(3) supremacy” (hierarchy of norms), 
“(4) stability” (rigidity of constitutional norms, resistance to change), “(5) fundamental 
rights, (6) review” (of judicial type), and “(7) accountability or democracy.”26
From this perspective, the constitutionalization of supranational order can be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) “Enabling constitutionalization”, which occurs when the Treaties confer on inter-
national institutions “the ability to create secondary international law.” This happened, 
for example, in the European Union (the creation of European legislation); the Security 
“Patterns of Constitutional Evolution and Change in Eastern Europe”, in J.J. Hesse, V. Wright (eds.), Constitutional Policy 
and Change in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, has developed this model identifying four functions of the 
constitution (limits, authorization, legitimation of power, and integration). On this analysis, see G. Bongiovanni, Costitu-
zionalismo e teoria del diritto, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2005, pp. 6 and ff.
25. G. Ulfstein, “The Relationship Between Constitutionalism and Pluralism”, in Göttingen Journal of International Law, 
4, 2012, pp. 575-83, underlining how “at the international level we have several treaties attributing power to international 
organs” which “exercise what may be called International public authority.” In this dimension, “the degree of delegation 
of power to international organs may vary between issue areas and functions, with an emerging International judiciary as 
one of the most prominent features.” At the same time, “as these organs become more powerful, there is a need for more 
control procedures and mechanisms.” On these aspects, see A. von Bogdandy, P. Dann, M. Goldmann, “Developing the 
Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities”, in A. von Bogdandy, 
R. Wolfrum, J. von Bernstorff , P. Dann, M. Goldmann (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions, 
Springer, Heidelberg, 2010.
26. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, pp. 10 and ff., noting that 
these mechanisms are “distinct ways to achieve these functions.”
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Council’s ability to establish binding rules (provided for in the Charter of the United 
Nations), and in some international court rulings (such as Costa v. ENEL, Van Gend en 
Loos, decided by the ECJ) that allocate in different ways to different actors (national 
and international) the power to create rules. In the economic sphere, this is done (by 
centralizing decision-making power) to make cooperation more effective, reduce trans-
action costs, and resolve conflicts.27
(2) “Constraining constitutionalization”, which results in the limitation imposed on 
the production of international law. This applies, for example, to the statement made by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the priority of the provisions of the 
Convention “over other treaty commitments made by member states”; this also applies 
to the principle of the equality of states and to the “international norms of a jus cogens 
character” that “act as constraints on the production of ordinary international law.” This 
type of rule often directly follows the enabling kind: it applies to Article 24 (1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which confers certain powers on the Security Council 
and at the same time links them to “Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” In 
the EU, this is done through the principle of subsidiarity: the possibility of action by 
the Union is due to the fact that certain activities cannot be envisaged by the Member 
States.28
(3) “Supplemental constitutionalization”, which refers to “international legal norms 
that arise in response to domestic constitutional deficiencies, particularly where the 
deficiency either arises from or is exacerbated by increased globalization and the in-
creasing density of international law.” Such constitutionalization, which can be seen 
as “a particular type of constitutional subsidiarity”, can be exemplified by the activity 
of ascertaining compliance with Community provisions on fundamental rights which 
follows on the Solange judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.29
This analysis, which makes it possible to process a matrix of constitutionalization,30 
highlights a number of important points. It allows us to highlight some structural as-
pects of the process of constitutionalization. Among these aspects we should emphasize 
the following:
27. Ibid., p. 11. On these aspects, in relation to the WTO, see J.L. Dunoff, “The Politics of International Constitutions: The 
Curious Case of the World Trade Organization”, in J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance, pp. 181 and ff.
28. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, pp. 10 and ff., note that the 
limitations imposed by the rules may have different effects and purposes, such as to preserve the states or the rights and 
autonomy of individuals.
29. Ibid., pp. 14 and ff.
30. Ibid., pp. 27-29, taking as reference areas the international system, the UN, the EU, the WTO, and human rights law.
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(a) One cannot speak of the existence of a single formal constitution (which is prob-
ably not even desirable) at the international level;31 
(b) Constitutionalization “is a process” in which “particular legal orders may ex-
hibit various constitutional mechanisms in various degrees.” In this sense, the process 
of constitutionalization “may develop in the international legal system as a whole or in 
specific subfields.”32
(c) No longer thinkable are “the orthodox distinctions in mainstream international 
relations theory between constitutionally-organized states, on the one hand, and inter-
national regimes, on the other”: this contrast is “untenable” and should be seen through 
the lens of “a continuum.”33
(d) Constitutionalization and the presence of “numerous constitutional orders pro-
duces the phenomenon of constitutional pluralism”: this entails the presence of differ-
ent subjects, systems, and organizations.34
The normative dimension of global constitutionalism
The analysis of the constitutionalization process leaves unresolved a number of im-
portant issues. Particularly relevant among these are the following aspects:
(a) The relationship, within constitutional pluralism, between different systems and 
organizations. This is a question that touches the role of the various subjects of interna-
tional law and the relation between “legislative” and “judicial” instances.
(b) The role and the way in which it is possible to consider types of legal regulation, 
especially soft law (and, in certain respects, the general principles of law), which on the 
one hand are widely accepted, but at the same time do not find a specific place within 
the reflection on the constitutionalization process.35
(c) The problem of the legitimacy of subjects and decisions at the transnational 
level. This is both a procedural matter that relates to the consent of the parties involved 
31. G. Ulfstein, “The Relationship Between Constitutionalism and Pluralism”, p. 577, according to which the “international 
legal system is not based on a formal constitution. We have neither a thick nor a thin constitution […] International law is 
still based on treaties and customary international law, not on a constitution.”
32. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, p. 32.
33. A. Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes”, p. 622.
34. J. Klabbers, “Setting the Scene”, in J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 43-44.
35. This means that soft law is sometimes considered to be at the same time an element of the constitutionalization process 
and, in a contrary fashion, an expression of fragmentation. On these issues, see E. Pariotti, “‘Soft law’ e ordine giuridico 
ultra-statuale tra ‘rule of law’ e democrazia”, in Ragion Pratica, 32, 2009.
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(first among which the states), and so to the problem of democratic legitimation, and 
to substantive aspects, that is, the question of what aspects of the decisions of suprana-
tional organizations should be “constraining.”36
These issues (the relationships between organizations, sources, procedural and sub-
stantive democratic legitimacy) have led many authors to deny the very possibility of 
constitutionalization of transnational law: this was done not only by denying the effec-
tiveness of this process, but also and especially by emphasizing the impossibility of real-
izing the ideals of constitutionalism at the supranational level. Although some authors 
have pointed out the difficulties and non-consistency of the process of constitutional-
ization (labeled a “paper tiger”),37 the comparison focuses on the normative definition 
of constitutionalism. As has been noted, even if you can agree on a set of transforma-
tions of supranational law, there remains the concern that this process can be described 
“in constitutional terms.”38 It is therefore a skeptical challenge which denies the pos-
sibility of realizing constitutionalism beyond the dimension of the nation-state (and 
which therefore puts the spotlight on the “principle of sovereignty” and the “consent of 
state”).39 The idea of  global constitutionalism must therefore address, at the normative 
level, the charge that it is not strictly speaking true constitutionalism.
It is possible to analyze this normative dimension of global constitutionalism in light 
of the distinction between Big C and Small c constitutionalism, a distinction proposed, 
among others, by M. Kumm.40 These are two perspectives that define different paths for 
the development of constitutionalization and pose different requirements of legitimacy. 
What differentiate these two approaches are the diverse “conditions of constitutional 
legitimacy” of international law that are required. This is in particular a question about 
procedural legitimacy (relating to the subjects of international and transnational law), 
from which thus depends the identification of the possible evolution of supranational 
law. Big or Large C41 constitutionalism identifies specific requirements of constitution-
36. J. Klabbers, “Setting the Scene”, pp. 37-43.
37. This is one of several criticisms of global constitutionalism that are reviewed and argued against by A. Peters, “The 
Merits of Global Constitutionalism”, pp. 400 and ff.
38. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 2, referring in 
particular to the positions advanced by D. Grimm, “The Achievements of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed 
World”, in M. Loughlin, P. Dobner (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
39. J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization”, p. 13, shows that this deba-
te has its origin in the increased production of international law “without unanimous state consent.”
40. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and 
beyond the State”, in J.L. Dunoff, J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance; Id., “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law.”
41. This definition is by A. Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism: Mapping an Emerging Field”, 2011, http://cosmopolis.wzb.
eu/content/program/conkey_Wiener_Mapping-Field.pdf, for whom Large C constitutionalism is founded “on the basic 
ideas relating to justice (such as human rights), procedural fairness and participation (e.g. democracy) and the rule of law 
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alism that refer to its accomplishments in the national state and to the “trinitarian com-
mitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law”, while small-c constitutional-
ism interprets constitutionalism “in a wide sense” and sees it as the set of “constitutive 
elements of legal and political practice that are central for the assessment of its legality 
or legitimacy.”42 On the first position, you cannot talk of constitutionalism in relation 
to certain formal properties, functional or substantial, of international relations, but 
it is a much more ambitious project: that present “in the tradition of the French and 
American revolutions [...] of establishing legitimate authority among free and equals.” 
Legitimate authority is derived from the constituent power “constituting and limiting 
public power by way of establishing a constitution that is the supreme law of the land.” 
Constitutionalism is therefore expressed in the fact of “establishing legitimate supreme 
authority for free and equals engaged in a collective exercise of self-government.” On 
this view, constitutionalism is an idea linked to the exercise of legitimate power based 
on the consent of free and equal individuals. As just mentioned, this can unfold in the 
“trinitarian formula of the constitutionalist faith [...] human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.”43 Small c constitutionalism, by contrast – arguing that “legal practices shar-
ing some structural features of Big C constitutionalism, but less centralized, more frag-
mented, imagined without reference to either ‘We the People’ or a sovereign state – can 
and does exist on the international level” (these are the elements of the constitutional-
ization process that we saw in the previous section).44
For Big C constitutionalism, there isn’t a global political community that may estab-
lish “a system of constitutional self-government.” This means that in the absence of such 
a structure, the idea of a  global constitutionalism is empty, and that it is “misleading to 
use the language of constitutionalism to describe international law.” From this perspec-
tive, “constitutionalism [...] does not exist beyond the state”, and talk about constitu-
tionalism serves only to cover up “the increasing divorce of international law from the 
legitimating anchor of state consent.” This link should instead not be broken up: from 
this perspective, the establishment of international authorities disrupts the possibility 
exercising oversight over policy and law (and that can be done only at the national lev-
el). It is only “the act of state consent” that creates a connection between “national con-
as they relate to institutional practices and policies in and beyond the state.”
42. Ibid.
43. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 4, who points 
out how this meaning of constitutionalism is not used as part of the “societal constitutionalism” expounded in G. Teubner, 
Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.
44. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 3.
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stitutional values and commitments to the generation of international law, bestowing 
whatever legitimacy it might have on it.” This means that “international law is derivative 
legitimacy-wise. It derives its legitimacy from the consent of states.”45
This is not true for small c constitutionalism, on which, on the contrary, the legit-
imacy of international legislation “does not depend on international legal obligations 
being traced back to the specific consent of obligated states”: this legitimacy is not only 
derivative but “stands on its own.”46
This means that constitutionalism undergoes a transformation in the transition from 
the national to the international level. In this setting, “when transposed to international 
level constitutionalist principles have been and must to some extend be modified, and the 
mode of his implementation as well.”47 In this sense, the fundamental fact is that “both 
operationally and legitimacy-wise the international legal order can be described as an 
‘autonomous’ legal order, that should be interpreted and progressively developed to better 
realize the constitutional values it is founded on.”48 The possibility that the consent of the 
states is no longer a decisive aspect of constitutionalism at the global level, and so that 
supranational law is no longer conceived “in derivative terms”, is linked to an awareness 
that “the legitimacy and efficacy of national and transnational legal and political practices 
are much more closely connected than conventionally acknowledged.”49 What is wrong 
with Big C constitutionalism is the inability to assess the relationship between the na-
tion-state and the global dimension. In this way, it disregards the fact that “national and 
international law have to be conceived in constitutional terms as mutually supportive and 
complementary.” Evidence for this fact (the non-insularity of national law) lies in the im-
possibility of separating the legitimacy of national decisions from the global context in 
which these decisions are made. This can be shown both by underlining the externalities 
that national decisions have (to varying degrees) in relations with other countries and by 
highlighting the lack of legitimacy of national systems (in the sense of a compensatory 
45. Ibid., noting that “this understanding of the foundation of international law has significant implications for the in-
terpretation and progressive development of international law [...]. From this perspective the talk of constitutionalism 
beyond the state misleadingly tends to cover-up the legitimacy deficit of an international law in which the link to state 
consent becomes more attenuated and the threat this constitutes to the achievements of domestic constitutionalism”. On 
these issues, see M.R. Ferrarese, La governance tra politica e diritto, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, p. 8, identifying the role of 
democracy as the “stone guest” of global governance.
46. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 4.
47. A. Peters, “Are We Moving towards Constitutionalization of the World Community?”, p. 119.
48. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 4.
49. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between National Constitutional 
Law and Constitutionalism beyond the State”, 2009, http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-cosmopolitan-turn-in-constitutiona-
lism-on-the-relationship-between-national-constitutional-law-and-constitutionalism-beyond-the-state/, p. 1.
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constitutionalism).50 This means that government decisions have an impact on the lives 
of other nations and peoples, so they must be justified in light of criteria (constitutional 
ones) that are not attributable only to the element of national democratic legitimacy.
In the first case (externalities), this is because national decisions affect the interests 
of other nations and peoples. This happens, for example, with the “policies relating to 
[...] carbon-dioxide emissions”, which cannot be legitimate just because they have been 
decided by a democratic process within a constitution “ultimately authorized […] by 
‘We the People’.”51 This means that legitimacy is not “self-standing”: in a whole range of 
issues (from pollution to energy and economic decisions and the regulation of bound-
aries) “the legitimacy of the practice of democratic constitutionalism depends in part 
on the how it relates to the wider legal and political world.” National choices bear con-
sequences that fall on other peoples and individuals: these are “justice-relevant negative 
externalities”. When these externalities (justice-sensitive or relevant) obtain, it is not 
possible simply to appeal to the democratic legitimacy of national decisions, because in 
these cases “states have a duty of justice to also act as trustees of humanity.” Not taking 
into account the “legitimate interests of affected outsiders” means neglecting the needs 
of justice: in these cases, deciding on one’s own “amounts to a form of domination.” This 
means that nation-states have a narrow scope for decision-making: the scope of issues 
on which a state “can plausibly claim legitimate authority is limited to questions that do 
not raise questions of justice-sensitive externalities.”52
Similar themes have been developed from the idea of  “compensatory constitutional-
ism”, which is aimed at highlighting the lack of legitimacy of national decisions. Global 
constitutionalism finds its main motivation in the need to compensate for these defi-
ciencies. Anne Peters points out three such deficiencies: 
50. A. Peters, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and 
Structures”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 19, 2006.
51. Cf. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between National Constitutional 
Law and Constitutionalism beyond the State”, p. 1, similarly noting that “if some Pacific Islands were to disappear as a result 
of global warming and its populations are uprooted at least in part because of domestic environmental decisions made by, 
say, the US, the US ‘beggar thy neighbor’ decisions are not legitimate merely because they were supported by democratically 
accountable institutions under the US constitution: Externalities matter.”
52. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, pp. 6 and 8, no-
ting that “the idea of sovereignty as ultimate authority, a conception of constitutionalism tied to the coercive institutions of 
the state and a conception of legitimacy and democracy reductively tied to the self-governing practices of ‘We the People’ 
is deeply misguided. It aggrandizes and misconstrues national constitutional practice and sells short legal and political 
practices beyond the state. It misconstrues the basic commitments underlying the constitutionalist tradition of the French 
and American Revolution.”
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A first deficiency stems from the fact that – because of global interdependen-
cies – state activities have become further reaching and more extraterritorial. This 
means that political decisions (e.g. on tax reduction, raising environmental stan-
dards, building nuclear plants) affect people in other states, people who have not 
elected the decision-makers and can in no way control them […]. A second as-
pect is that the transnational character of issues, and the mobility and interaction 
of individuals, firms, and NGOs (despite the increasing extraterritorial effects of 
regulation), have on the whole reduced the power of the nation state to tackle and 
solve problems by itself. [...] The third deficiency lies in the lack of any democratic 
mandate for or control of non-state decision-makers. In order to regain control, 
states have to co-operate within international organizations, through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and so forth.53
These analyses point out that, from a normative point of view, global constitutional-
ism is linked to “deep interdependencies between national and international law.” This 
means that supranational law “is neither derivative, nor is it autonomous”; rather, “na-
tional and international law form an integrative whole.” This awareness, which is widely 
highlighted in the analysis of the constitutionalization process, shows that the primary 
need of global constitutionalism derives from the issues of justice posed by transna-
tional and international relations. The substantive content of global constitutionalism 
therefore lies in the realization of these demands for justice. As has been pointed out in 
connection with this issue, in cases raising issues of justice, “each state is under a stand-
ing obligation to support, help further develop and subject itself to a constitutional 
system of international law that is equipped to authoritatively address these issues.” If it 
does not, or at least if “an impartial and appropriately participatory procedure” is not 
created, decisions are illegitimate and unjust, and as noted they amount to “an act of 
domination, if [...] actors refuse to subject themselves to an impartial procedure pro-
viding equal participatory opportunities for those whose reasonable justice claims are 
implicated.”54 What is significant is therefore the direct link between constitutionalism 
and the demands of justice, a link that in turn stems from the need that “we treat all in-
dividuals’ morally legitimate interests as having ultimate, general, and equal concern.”55 
53. A. Peters, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and 
Structures”, pp. 591 and ff. See also G. Ulfstein, “The Relationship Between Constitutionalism and Pluralism”, p. 578, noting 
that “domestic organs suffer from an ‘output’ deficit.”
54. A. Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, no. 1, 2007, p. 39.
55. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, p. 11. The fol-
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This leads us to consider humanity as a whole as a reference for constitutionalism.56 
This, of course, opens up further reflection on the possible evolution of global consti-
tutionalism.57
global constitutionalism and legal theory: a quick (and incom-
plete) survey
Many of the aspects that have so far been briefly discussed have a significant impact 
on the theory of law. I shall try in this final section to very briefly indicate what the most 
important of these aspects are and what some research avenues may be. This is a simple 
survey only meant to point out some research fields, with no claim to completeness. 
Some of these questions relate in general to the relationship between theory and global-
ized law (and between trends of fragmentation and unification/constitutionalization), 
while others are more specifically related to constitutionalism. These questions are as 
follows: (a) the concept of law; (b) the relation between law and justice; (c) the theory 
of rights; (d) the theory of the constitution; (e) soft law and coercion; and (f) legal 
reasoning.
I will briefly analyze the first question, while the others will only receive cursory 
remarks.
(a) Two main camps can be distinguished in the debate on the concept of law: on 
the one hand are the positions that are part of analytic philosophy and propose that 
this conception be brought up to date to deal with transnational law (this is a position 
espoused by K. Culver and M. Giudice);58 on the other hand are the positions which 
argue that the analytical approach is inadequate and that we need a concept of law that 
lowing example is offered in Id., “The cosmopolitan turn in constitutionalism: On the relationship between national con-
stitutional law and constitutionalism beyond the state”: “Imagine a multilateral global climate change Treaty negotiated 
in Copenhagen enjoying widespread support from rich, poor, southern and northern states, but suffering from the lack 
of support of one or two economically important hold-out states. Now assume that a reformed more participatory UN 
Security Council Resolution enacted the substantive content of the Treaty as universal obligations, thereby imposing obli-
gations on holdout-states that refused to give their consent to the Treaty: There are circumstances under which the claim 
that such an imposition of obligations on non-consenting states would be illegitimate because of a lack of democratic 
accountability would be implausible. The comparative advantage in terms of legitimacy might, under some circumstances, 
be on the side of global law.”
56. E. Benvenisti, “Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders”, 27 No-
vember 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1863228.
57. For a series of proposals de lege ferenda, see A. Peters, “Are We Moving towards Constitutionalization of the World 
Community?”, pp. 129 and ff.
58. K. Culver, M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence.
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draws on the idea of legal pluralism (this is a position espoused by B. Tamanaha,59 W. 
Twining,60 and D. von Daniels).61
Culver and Giudice argue that Hart’s and Raz’s analytical theories cannot give an 
account of the evolution of law, and in particular of the forms of law that have devel-
oped within and beyond the state.62 According to these authors, there is an “inability of 
dominant analytical approaches to capture legal phenomena outside the model of the 
law-state” because these approaches are mainly focused on state legal systems. Hart’s 
and Raz’s theories can account for the various types of supra-national law only “to the 
extent that they share the characteristic features of state law or are in some way actually 
supported by or connected to state practice or recognition.” This, however, is a toolbox 
that is no longer applicable: “state-based explanations – with their commitment to the 
ideas of ‘official’, ‘hierarchy’, and ‘system’ – very likely distort the nature of emerging 
forms of prima facie legality, forcing as they do all experience of legality through un-
derstanding of the law-state.” According to these authors the centrality Hart ascribes to 
“legal officials” is no longer tenable in the context of supranational law, where such of-
ficials are difficult to identify. As for Raz, the main problem lies mainly in the argument 
that the law has supremacy over other normative orders: this, too, is an argument that 
does not hold up, either historically or in supra-national law.63
The new model proposed by these authors starts from the institutionalist theory of 
law set out by N. MacCormick and developed as an “inter-institutional theory.”64 From 
this perspective, legality (or what makes something law) depends on “variegated com-
binations of legal institutions, institutions of law, and function-oriented content-inde-
pendent peremptory norms and associated normative powers.” This means that legality 
depends on different combinations of these factors, which are viewed as indicators of 
legality, and which may be related in very different ways: “In this picture, diverse kinds 
of relation of mutual reference among these elements characterize legality, rather than 
59. B. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, in Sydney Law Review, 30, 2008; Id., 
“What Is ‘General’ Jurisprudence? A Critique of Universalistic Claims by Philosophical Concepts of Law”, 2012, http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2018283; Id., Law as Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.
60. W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2009.
61. D. von Daniels, The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective, Ashgate, Farnham, 2010.
62. As noted before (note 1), this is a matter of (a) intra-state legality (e.g., forms of shared governance, as between national 
and central authorities in Canada); (b) trans-state legality (concerning, for example, the production of standards which 
takes place outside the state, by private organizations or by private contract, but which has an effect within the state, as is 
the case with the control of the ocean’s fish resources); (c) supra-state legality (as in the case of the European Union); and 
(d) super-state legality (for example, ius cogens).
63. K. Culver, M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence, pp. xvi, xxiv, xxvii.
64. See D. Patterson, “Book Review of Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence”, in Law and Philosophy, 31, 2012, 
p. 593, for whom “the key moves in the book are these: Hart and Raz are replaced by MacCormick.”
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a particular relation to a hierarchical, comprehensive, supreme, and open law-state.” Le-
gality is therefore given by these “elements of legality” that can give rise to very different 
sets (of institutions, goals, or relationships). The advance on Raz’s and Hart’s analytic 
theory is that this conception of legality 
makes minimal use of the ideas of legal officials and legal system in explanation 
of the existence and borders of legality. Where legal officials and legal system are 
present, these represent particular combinations of norms, powers, institutions, 
inter-institutional relations, and subject matter, most often focused in the law-
state. But the connection between legal official and legal system on the one hand, 
and legality on the other, is best characterized as contingent65 
at the same time, this approach, unlike the pluralist approach, is able to maintain in 
its definition a set of essential elements of law.
The proposals on legal pluralism tend to offer a vision of law that is not formalized. 
This is very evident in the conception proposed by B. Tamanaha, which denies the pos-
sibility of identifying the essential characteristics of law. Global law is seen as “another 
wave of legal pluralism”, for “it counts as ‘law’ a range of private norms and regulatory 
institutions.”66 Tamanaha argues that “what is law” cannot be identified in situations of 
pluralism: this is an issue that “has never been resolved, despite innumerable efforts by 
legal theorists and social scientists.”67 According to this author, 
law is a ‘folk concept’, that is, law is what people within social groups have come 
to see and label as ‘law’. It could not be formulated in terms of a single scientific 
category because over time and in different places people have seen law in dif-
ferent terms. State law is currently the paradigm example of law, but at various 
times and places, including today, people have considered as law: international 
65. K. Culver, M. Giudice, Legality’s Borders: An Essay in General Jurisprudence, pp. xxviii, xxxi.
66. According to B. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, pp. 386 and ff., two as-
pects contribute to the spread of the idea of  global legal pluralism: the first is related to the fact that the debate on transna-
tional law has been focused “on internal divergences or conflicts” (and that “immediately ‘produces’ legal pluralism”); the 
second “relates to what one considers ‘law’ for the purposes of legal pluralism. As indicated, discussions of legal pluralism 
on the global level routinely include various forms of private regulation, private dispute resolution bodies, and the activi-
ties of private entities like NGOs or trade associations. This is considered legal pluralism.”
67. Ibid., pp. 391 and ff., where, in the context of the debate on legal pluralism, this question is seen as related to what is 
known as Malinowski’s problem: the fact of defining law as “maintenance of normative order within a social group” makes 
it indistinguishable from other sorts of human behavior. On the impossibility of identifying a philosophical concept of law, 
with reference to the conception expounded by S. Shapiro, see B. Tamanaha, “What Is ‘General’ Jurisprudence? A Critique 
of Universalistic Claims by Philosophical Concepts of Law.”
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law; customary law; versions of religious law; the lex mercatoria; the ius commune; 
natural law and more. These various manifestations of law do not all share the 
same basic characteristics – beyond the claim to represent legitimate normative 
authority – which means they cannot be reduced to a single set of elements for 
social scientific purposes.68
This approach, on which legal pluralism “exists whenever social actors identify more 
than one source of ‘law’ within a social arena”, makes it possible to highlight “many of 
the important and interesting features of situations of contemporary legal pluralism.” 
Reference is being made here to the fact that “law in contemporary society is an instru-
ment, a tool or mechanism for doing things, an empty vessel that can be filled in any 
way desired to serve any end desired. Legal institutions in modern societies are resourc-
es of power which individuals, groups, corporate actors, and government actors utilize 
in a multitude of ways to advance a multitude of objectives.”69 
In contemporary societies, this requires that if we are “to understand the full range 
and complexity of law in contemporary society, the long dominant social ordering per-
spective must make room for a focus on the extraordinary variety of applications of this 
tool.” Law is “a consummately flexible, multifunctional, multipurpose, multiuse way of 
doing things.”70 This approach can be compared to Twining’s conception, putting for-
ward a definition of law that proceeds independently of “norms (or rules), systems (or 
orders), groups, or tradition”71 in an attempt to include different forms of regulation 
on an approach capable of taking contemporary phenomena into account. In the same 
vein, von Daniels’s analysis offers an integration of the theory of rules, arguing that if 
we are to have a proper understanding of contemporary law, next to primary and sec-
ondary rules we should recognize “linkage rules” designed to bring different regulatory 
systems into relation.72
(b) Law and justice. One of the most significant aspects of global constitutional-
ism lies in the central role accorded to issues of justice. As we have seen, this is one of 
the main arguments used in support of the inadequacy of national constitutionalism. 
Supranational law arises from the needs and demands of justice; its legitimacy also de-
pends on how these claims are met. This, of course, is but one aspect of the relationship 
68. B. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global”, p. 396.
69. B. Tamanaha, “Law and Society”, 2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345204, p. 21.
70. Ibid.
71. W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, p. 119.
72. D. von Daniels, The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective, pp. 160-62.
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between law and morality: what makes meaningful the reflection of global constitution-
alism is that it presents legal theory with the task of setting in procedural and substan-
tive ways alike the conditions for satisfying these requirements.73
(c) The theory of rights. The importance of the demands of justice for the legitima-
cy of national and transnational decisions leads not only to the centrality of rights but 
also to that of duties. There are duties that, at least prima facie, do not involve direct 
rights (except as they generically bring into play the equal consideration of individuals 
and of humanity). The theory of law must go back to the analysis of the relationship 
between rights and duties, and a useful starting model might be that developed by H. 
Shue, highlighting that (i) there is a plurality of duties (which have different contents 
and attach to different subjects) entrusted with ensuring the rights and needs of justice, 
and that (ii) these duties “must not necessarily be performed by the same individuals or 
institutions.”74 The dogmatics of rights should be integrated with duties and with the 
effectiveness of the principles of justice and of rights.
(d) The theory of the constitution. The problem, as we have seen, is that of the changes 
that constitutionalism has to undergo in the transition from the national to the supra-
national dimension. In this latter dimension, the most important problem is the lack of 
democratic legitimacy. This problem can perhaps find a solution in a deliberative inter-
pretation of democracy, a democracy open to the contribution of national and non-state 
actors operating at different levels: different areas of decision-making and a number of 
subjects may possibly lead to the formation of public spheres relevant in the international 
arena and to the formation of legitimate decisions as coming from a process that develops 
in regard to certain issues75.
(e) Soft law and coercion. The presence of primary rules that seem more like rec-
ommendations or advice and cannot be enforced if disregarded has raised questions 
about what status they have. One possible answer lies in the increasing significance of 
(the possibility of) enforcement. In connection with international relations and soft 
law, O. Hathaway and S. Shapiro have proposed a new class of enforcement: outcasting. 
This is a method distinct from what “modern states use to enforce their law.” Indeed, 
73. M. Kumm, “The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law”, puts forward, 
for example, a “practice theory of justice”, suggesting that we use what R. Nozick termed the “Lockean proviso” to identify 
issues of distributive justice.
74. H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, p. 52, 
identifying three types of duties: I. (Negative) duties to avoid depriving (Individuals and Institutions); II. (Positive) duties 
to protect from deprivation (Institutions); and III. (Positive) duties to aid the deprived (Individuals and Institutions).
75. On supranational deliberative democracy, see J. Bohman, Democracy Across Borders, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 
2007.
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“outcasting is nonviolent: it does not rely on bureaucratic organizations, such as police 
or militia, that employ physical force to maintain order. Instead, outcasting involves de-
nying the disobedient the benefits of social cooperation and membership.” Outcasting 
appears to be “ubiquitous in modern International law, from the World Trade Organi-
zation to the Universal Postal Union to the Montreal Protocol” and makes it possible 
to “recognize that the traditional critique of international law – that it is not enforced 
and is therefore both ineffective and not real law – is based on a limited and inaccurate 
understanding of law enforcement.”76
(f) Legal reasoning. The evolution of the supranational level has often been associ-
ated with the “juristocracy”, and so with the expansion of the courts’ decision-making 
power.77 Most constitutional literature does not see this evolution as a serious problem 
so long as reliable criteria of rationality can be established. Part of the literature has 
shown that the model that compares different courts is linked to an argument based on 
the precedent:78 the task of a theory in this field is to identify criteria (like those based on 
the reasoning by factors)79 that may provide predictability and uniformity.
76. O. Hathaway, S. Shapiro, “Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law”, in The Yale Law Journal, 121, 
2011. On this proposal, see M. Maduro, “Comment on Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro Outcasting: They have some 
good news and some bad news”, 2011, www.opiniojuris.org.
77. R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, Harvard University Press, 
Harvard, 2004.
78. See, among many others, A. Lollini, “Il diritto straniero nella giurisprudenza costituzionale: Metodi ‘forte’ e ‘debole’ a 
confronto”, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 62, 2012.
79. G. Sartor, “Reasoning with Factors”, in Argumentation, 19, 2005.
